Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1958

Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Structural Steel &
Forge Co. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Fabian, Clendenin, Moffat & Mabey; Calvin L. Rampton; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Structural Steel & Forge Co., No. 8785 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2999

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO.,
A corporation,
Plaimt~ff o;nd Respondent,

v.

Case No. 8785

STRUCTURAL STEEL & FORGE
CO., a corporation,
Defendant and A ppella;nt.

BRIE·F OF APPELLANT

FABIAN, ·CLENDENIN,
MOFFAT & MABEY
by ALBERT J. CoLTON
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
Attorneys for Appellant
Structual Steel & Forge Oo.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTEN·TIS
Page
STATEMENT ·OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------1

STATEMENT 0 F PO IN'TS -------------------------------------------ARGUMEN:T ---------------------------------------------------------------------i.S
POIN'T I. :THE RAILROAD t}lf USING THE U'TAH
COUR'TS AS A DEVICE TO ·GAIN ACCESS TO
A BODY OTHERWISE INACCESSIBL.E TO I'T.
POIN·T II. THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR AS TO
WHETHER THE :TRIAL COURT IS ASKING
THE INTERS'TA'TE COMMERCE COMMISSION 'TO DECIDE ·THE CASE OR GIVE ADVICE. ________________________ -----------------___________ ---------------_____ __

5
6
6

7

POINT III. 'THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOES NOT ARISE AND DOES
8
NOT APPLY IN !THIS CASE. -------------------------------(a) 'The history of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. --------------------------________________ ________ ______________
8
(b) Analysis of the doctrine of primary j urisdiction shows it does not arise in the instant
case. __________ -----------------------------------___ ______ __ ______ __ ____ 18
(c) Even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
did arise, it is not applicable in this case. ____ 21
POINT IV. THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE
COURTS OF 'THIS STATE WISH TO ABDIC~TE VOLUNTARILY SOME OF :THEIR JURISDICTION AND WHE'THER THEY CAN DO
THIS. ______________________ ____________________ ____ ________________ ____ ____ __ __ 24
CON CLUSI 0 N --------------------------------------------------------------------

40

INDEX OF ·CASES AND AU'THORTTIES
CASES CITED :
\ .A:bilene Cotton Oil Co. v. ·Texas & Pac. R. Co., 38 Tex.
Civ.' App. 366, 85 S. W. 1052 ( 1905) -------------------- 10
Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Pl aces to Eat, 131
F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942) ____________________________________ 3'5, 36
1

Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448,
53 Sup. Ct. 441, 77 L. Ed. 888 ( 1933) __________________

28

Bernstein Bros. Pipe & Machine ·co. v. Denver &
R.G.R.R. Co., 193 F. 2d 441 ('lOth Cir. '1951) ------------

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TA'BLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
. Page
Brentwood-McMechen Water c·o. v. Wheeling, 121 W.
Va. 373, 4 S. E. 2d 300 ( 1'939) ------------------------30, 31
Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Chicago and W.I.R.R. Co., 331
Ill. 151, 162 N .E. 85·2 ( 1928) -------:-------------------------29, 30
Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co., 68 ·cal. App. 725, 158 P. 23
( 1945) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 29
~Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259
U.S. 285, 66 L. Ed. 943, 42 Sup. Ct. 477 (1922) ____ 13,
.
1~ 15, 2~34
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 54 Sup. Ct. 700, 78
L. Ed. 1248 ( 1934) ----------------~----------------------------------- 20
Houston Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad .Commis~&'sion, 19 S.W. 2d 583. (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd .
124 Tex. 375, 78 S.W. '2d 591 (1935) ----~-----------26, 27
1
Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 32 L. Ed. 764 (1889) 34
\ K~ovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas ·co., 279 N.Y. 304,

~a~~e;: ;s~g ::)N~;th--Chi~;~:--125--F~--2d
9

~

rfhe

30

330 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 693,
63 Sup. Ct. 43'2, 87 L. Ed. 555 ( 1943) ~------------------- 20
~· JMadregano v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric -Co., 181 Wis.
611, 195 N:.W. 861 (1923) ------------------------------------ 31
/Main Realty Co. v. Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric
.
fl! Co., 59 R.I. 29, ~93 A. 879 ( 1937) ________________ 25, 26, 28
J Miller v. Railroad Commission, 9 Cat 2d 190, 70 P.
2d 164 ( 193 7) ------------------------------------------------------------ . 27
Neagle, In re, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658, 34 L. Ed.
55 ( 1890) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 39
~petti v. Alicandro, 317 Mass. 382, 58 N.E. 2d 155
( 194·4) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co., 237
U.S. 121, 35 Sup. Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867 ( 1915) ---- 12,
~
'
.
. .
.
13, 30
~quare D. Co. v. United Electrical ~ad1o & 1\Iach.
Wkrs., 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. M1ch. 1954) -------- 21
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553 ( 1907) ________________ 9, 11
Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. American Tie & ·Timber Co.,
234 U.S. 138, 58 L. Ed. 125'5, 34 Sup. Ct. 885
( 1914) ----------------------------------------------------------------15, 16, 22
}1-6'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

_ TABLE OF CON'TENT'S-Continued
Page
Transportation Co. v. Commission, 125 W. Va. 71,
23 S.E. 2d 53 ( 1942) _------------------------------------------------ 31
Truck Owners, Inc. v. Superio'r Court, 194 ·Cal. 146,
228 P. 19 ( 1924) --------------r---.:_------------------------------------- 27
Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 390,
111 F. Supp. 266 ( 1953) ---------------------------------------- 17
United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,
77 Sup. Ct. 161, 1 L. Ed. 2d 126 ( 1956) ____ '3, 4, 7, 12, 17,
21, 2'2, 23, 24, 28
""'STttr•
Vallejo Bus Co. v. Superi'or Court, 19 Cal. App. 201,
65 p. 2d 86 ( 1937) -------------~-------------------------------------- 27
5
Waukesha Gas & E. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., 175
_..~
Wis. 420, 184 N .W. 702 ( 1921) ____________________________ 27, 32
Western Pac. ·R. Co. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 115,
131 F. S u pp. 919 ( 1955) ---------------------------------:----------- 17
Western Pac. R.R. Co. v. Wasatch Chemical Co., 117
Utah 411, ·217 P. 2d 371 ( 1950) ---------------------------- 32
STATUTES CITED:
Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 9, 24 STA'T. 382
( 1887) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Act to Regul'ate Commerce, c. 104, § 22, 24 STAT. 387
( 1887) ------------------------------------------------=------------------------- 10
Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, § 1, 5 and 7 ---------------- 34
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 43 (a), 53 ____ 35, 36, 37
49 U.S. C.A., § · 9 ---------------------------------------:------------------------- 19
49 U.S.C.A., § 9 & 13 -------------------------------------------:------------6
ARTICLES AND TREATISES CITED:
19 AM. JUR., Equity, § 365 -------------------------------------------- 37
42 AM. JUR., Public Administrative Law, § 254 ________
9
45 AM. JUR., References, § 17 -----------------------------------37
Convisser, Prima'ry Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its
Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 ( 1956) ____ 10, 11, 33
DAVIS, ADMINISTRA'TIVE LAW (19_51) ____________ 9, 11, 19
Jaffe, Primary Jurisdictional Reconsidered, 102 U.
P A. L. REV. 577 (1954) ----------------------------------------18, 33
5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ( 1951) ________________ 35
von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67
HARV. L. REV. 929 ( 1954) ________________________ 11, 12, 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UNION P A·CIFIC RAIL.ROAD CO.,
A corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Case No. 8785

STRUCTURAL STEEL & FORGE
CO., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Railroad commenced these actions in the District ·Court of the Third Judicial District against appellant for money allegedly due under contracts of rail
carriage. Appellant is engaged in the business of fabricating structural iron and steel. The dispute involves
construction of a ''fabrication in transit'' tariff filed
by the Railroad (Union Pacific Tariff 7188-P).
This tariff, as all plaintiff's tariffs, was originally
drafted by the Tariff Bureau of the Union Pacific. Sub1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sequent revisions of a tariff are shown by a letter after
the original tariff. The letter '' P'' in this tariff number
shows that it is at least the sixteenth revision of this
particular tariff. After being drafted by a Railroad a
tariff is filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission
which reviews it only to see if it has complied with
certain technical requirements as to form. If no objections are made by shippers within thirty days from the
date of filing with the Commission, the tariff becomes
effective. No objecions were made to the particular tariff.
The fabrication in transit tariff gives fabricating
industries located at specified stations along the lTnion
Pacific which receive, fabricate and then reship steel
and iron products the lower through-rate (plus nominal
handling costs) from the original point of departure
of the unfabricated materials to their ultimate destination, rather than charging the fabricator the two more
expensive short-haul rates into and out of the fabricating
point. One of the results of such a tariff is to place
Intermountain manufacturers in a mote competitive situation with relation to manufacturers located either where
steel originates or "~here the final shipment terminates.
This tariff is not ".,.hat 1nay be called a rate tariff
(i.e., one establishing rates and charges for the transportation of particular classes of conuuodities). The tariff
jn dispute 1nerely atte1npts to define the factual situutions \vhich n1ust apply and the procedures \Yhieh must
b<:: followed before a shipper \viii be entitled to the lower
through-rate \rhieh rate is established for the various
articles shipped by separate through-rate tariffs) as
2
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opposed to the higher charges resulting from separate
short-haul rates from origin to transit point and from
transit point to final destination. The Railroad contends that the facts surrounding each of the shipments
in question do not meet the conditions of the fabricationin-transit tariff. The defendant shipper contends they
do. The shipper does not~..Qontend_he.rg that the rates
(either thJ_g-q_gh-r~t~t._or ---~hoxt:·ha:ul) are J:tp._reasonable_
nor that.inuL:w..per ___~l~§~ifiQatiqn of p~rtiQlJJ~!'-. articles
in the various ship_me11 ts. . has~.I~~uJJe.<;t jg ..th~ shipper
improperly b~ing charged J9o high a __raJ~!__The sole dispute is as to the application of Tariff 7188-P ~o particular operations of the defendant. For example; there
is a dispute as to construction of the words "fabricate"
and ''rework,'' the Railroad contending that certain procedures followed by defendant do not qualify as "fabrication'' or ''reworking'' within the meaning of the tariff.
If the tariffis construed as allowing the procedures followed by defendant with regard to the particular shipments in questiqn, the defendant is entitled to the
through-rate and the Railroad's claims are invalid.
The record does not show whether the Railroad
ex parte sought the assistance of the Interstate Commerce Commission before bringing these actions; it does
show that the actions had been at is-sue for more than
a year when the plaintiff Railroad petitioned the District Court ''for continuance and referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission", alleging that the doctrine
of ''primary jurisdiction'' enunciated in Unvted States
v. Western Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 77 Sup. Ct. 161,
3
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1 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1956), was applicable to this, case (~.
P. 37-38). The petition asked that the court hold in
abeyance the trial until five specific questions set forth
in plaintiff's petition involving the construction of
Tariff 7188-P ''had been submitted to and detennined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission". The petition
further asked the court to order plaintiff to institute
a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Comlnission but to retain jurisdiction "for all purposes".

On November 13, 1957, the Honorable Merrill C.
Faux executed an order that the five questions· set
forth in the Railroad's petition be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission ''for answer and determination by that body". The order further provided:
'~IT

IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the
above numbered causes be held in abeyance, and
they are hereby continued to permit a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission of
the issues of fact involved herein.
"IT IS FURTHER OR.JDERED that the
Commission n1ake such further report and deternlination on the issues of tariff interpretation
and issues of fact as it n1aY deem necessary or
advisable for the further inf~rmation of the court.
'·IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said
proceedings be instituted before the Interstate
Conunerce Conn11ission 'Yithin thirty days from
the date of this order.
'~IT IS FUR-THER ORDERED that a cerified eo py of this order be filed in the proceedings
to be instjtuted before ~the Interstate ·Commerce
Conunission.
4
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"The court here by retains jurisdiction of said
causes for all purposes."
Defendant then petitioned fo,r an intermediate appeal of this order of referral, .and on April 22, 1958
this court granted the appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
tS

THE RAILROAD m USING THE UTAH COURTS AS
A DEVICE TO GAIN AOCESS TO A BODY OTHERWISE
INACCESSIBLE TO IT.
POINT II.
THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER THE
TRIAL COURT IS ASKING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION TO DECIDE THE CASE OR GIVE ADVICE.
POINT III.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOES
NOT ARISE AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
(a) The history of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
(b) Analysis of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction shows
it does not arise in the instant case.
(c) Even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did ari·se,
it is not applicable in this case.
POINT IV.
THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE COURTS OF
THIS STATE WISH TO ABDICATE VOLUNTARILY SOME
OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND WHETHER THEY CAN
DO THIS.

5
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IS

THE RAILROAD ~ USING THE UTAH COURTS AS
A DEVI·CE TO GAIN AGCESS TO A BODY OTHERWISE
INACCESSIBLE TO IT.

This is an action for breach of contract of carriage
brought by a carrier against a shipper. The Railroad
could have brought this action in either of two forumseither the United States District Court, Berstein Bros.
Pipe & Machtne Co. v. Denver & R. G. RR. ·Co., 193 F.
2d 441 (lOth Cir. 1951), or the Utah District Court.
One thing is certain: the Railroad could not have tnvtir
ated thi~s action before the Interstate Commerce Comm~ssion.

The Interstate ·Commerce Act give_~ sl~i.P-J2§rs_~ertain
rights to make complaint to the CQPJJ1l~§_SiQn against
a. Q~rJie:r__(i9 U.S.C.A~_SeQ.~~ and Sec. ~_al.h11J the carrier
is givep._p_o :right under thatl!~.:t1lGQWJ:ll~_QGe any action. .
~ainst a shjp_Q_~_:r _Q~f()re the Interstate _QQpUJlerce CoinmiSSIOn.
But in this case the Railroad seeks to have its claim
determined by the Interstate Commerce Co1nmission, a
right not given it by the Interstate Commerce Act. It
seeks to do this, str.angely enough, by conm1encing its
action in the state court and by invoking the doctrine of
''primary jurisdiction.'' By this 'vonderous phrase, a
plaintiff seeks to switch foru1ns in midstream, and by
bringing suit in one forum, to end up in the very forum
that it could never have reached if it had tried to reach
6
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it directly. The Railro.ad, a modern Perseus, cannot reach
the Gorgon's head by looking directly at it, but by using
the state court as a mirror, seek to attain its goal.
This case is unique. To appellant's knowledge there
are no cases extant ruling on the questions posed here.
It is ,also a significant case, as it deals with the construction of a tariff which has a direct bearing on the
co~petitive situation of all Intermountain fabricators.
POINT II.
THE RECORD IS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER THE
TRIAL COURT IS ASKING THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION TO DE~CIDE THE CASE OR GIVE ADVICE.

Appellant has not been able, ,and is yet unable, to
ascertain the role in which the ins.tant Order casts the
Inters.tate Commerce ·Commission. Are its determinations, which under the Order are unlimited in nature or
scope, to bind the court~, QL._~r~_ th~y- only ~Q,yisory, .to,.
b~. accepteq. or__ :r;ejeGt~q. in the _di_~yr~ti.O.:r:t~- of .th~_court ~,
or both~ The record a~d_Qrde.ryyill _SlJpport eitl!gr__fh_~_<;>ry.
The ,appellant is unable to resolve the ambiguity.
The petition by which appellee asked for the order
cited the Western Pac~fvc case, supra. It stated that the
aetion "presents a situation analogous to that dealt
with in Western Pacific'' (r.p. 37). Western Pac~fiJc,
as will be noted hereafter, is a ''primary jurisdiction''
decision. The petition further asked that certain questions be submitted ''by appropriate administrative proeedure to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination (r.p. 38, emphasis supplied). The cited ver7
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b.age leads appellant to believe that the Commission's
findings are to be determinative. This belief is reinforced
by the O.rder 's language: that five specified questions
''be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission
for answer and determination by that body" (r.p. 42).
Other language, however, clouds the issue. The petition recites that the reference is ''to assist this court in
the determination of the issues" (r.p. 38). The Memorandum DeciE;on states that, "Primary jurisdiction of that
cause is in the Utah District Court" (r.p. 40), and the
order requires that the Commisson's report extend to
"tariff interpretation" (r.p. 43), a subject matter, as will
be seen, that is clearly for the courts. Taken alone, the
quoted portions would lead appellant to believe that the
Commission is to act as "a sort of master".
The mischief of th£l__Qrder is apparent. Appellee 'vill , ,
be able to argue to the trial court that any finding of
th~ i]Qm.m.!ssion favorable to app~lle~ is conclusive. ~f·~- .
ho}Ve_v~r, ~Jl.Y answ~~ri~--!!~~~vor_~bl~, .appell~e.
th~t

will ~rgue

it is Jil~rely ~<tYi.~9ry.

Certainly the Railroad should 1nake clear "\Yhich position it is taking. However, it is appellant's contention
that neither reason would justify referral in this case.
POINT III.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOES
NOT ARISE AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
(a) The history of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

To understand completely the issue here, it is first
8
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necessary to review the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
upon which the Railroad relies.
This doctrine is .a common law development of the
United States Federal Court system. In state courts little
mention is made of it. Some states, in meeting similar
problems, have reached similar results, while othe.r state
courts have expressly repudiated the doctrine. 42 A.M.
JUR., Public Admin~strative Law, § 254, at 701. See this
brief, infra, pp. 2±-32.
''The fountainhead from which the entire primary
jurisdiction doctrine flows is Texas & Pacific R. Co. v.
Ab~lene Cotton O~l Co.," 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51
L. Ed. 553 (1907) DAVIS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 665
(1951). That case was one where a shipper, without resorting to the Interstate Commerce Commission, attempted to
recover damages in a Texas state court from the Railroad for allegedly excessive charges for the transportation of freight. The shipper based his action on' Section
9 and Section 22 of the Act. Section 9 provided in part:
''That any person or persons claiming to be
damaged by ,any common carrier subject to -the
provisions of this act may either make complaint
to the ·Commission as hereinafteT provided for,
or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for
the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions
of this .act, in any district or circuit court of
the -united States of competent jurisdiction; but
such person or persons shall not have the right
to pursue both of said remedies, and must in
each case elect which one of the two methods of
9
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procedure herein provided for he or they will
adopt ... "
Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 9, 24 STAT.
382 (1887)
Section 22 expressly stated that:
''Nothing in this act contained shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing
.at common law or by statute, but the provisions of
this act are in addition to such remedies . . . ''
Act to Regulate Commerce, c. 104, § 22, 24 STAT.
387 (1887)
The shipper relied on what was, from the legislative
history of the Act, the unequivocal legislative intention
that the courts should have original jurisdiction of some
matters th.at might also be within the Commission's province. See Convisser, Primary Jurisd~ction: The Rule
and Its RationalizatiDns, 65 YALE L. J. 315 at 317-328
(195'6).
The trial court, while finding the rate in question
unreasonable and excessive, nevertheless held that since
the rate had been filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission it was. the rate ''established under the Interstate Commerce law" and gave judgment to the Rai1
road. The Texas Court of Civil . .~ppeals reversed,
Abi.Zene Cotton Oi~l Co. v. Te:ras & Pac. R. Co., 38 Tex.
Civ. App. 366, 85 S. W. 1052 (1905). The Texas Appellate
Court stated the issue as ''whether in a state court a
shipper in cases of interstate carriage can, by the principles of the common la,v, be accorded relief from unjust
and unreasonable freight rates extracted from him, or
10
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shall relief in such cases be denied merely because such
unreasonable rate has been filed and promulgated by
the carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act~", Id. at
368, 85 S.W. at 1053. The court found the .answer in
the common law right of action which it ruled had been
preserved by the Act.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for a unanimous United
St:ates Supreme Court, reversed, holding that under what
is now known as the Interstate Commerce Act a shipper
seeking reparations from .a railroad for excessive freight
charges must ''primarily invoke redress through the
Interstate 'Commerce Commission." Texas & Pac. R. Co .
. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., supra at 448.
The decision has not been without strong criticism.
Davis terms it ''one of the gy_tst~::!n.ding examples in JM1
Supreme Court ]listory of ~'interpret.aiLo.n~-w~h leads_
to a result diamet;rically ()pposed !9.__,c!~-~r. ~!l~t~E.?ambig
uous st3Jtutqry: l~nguage,'' DAVIS supra 665. Another
.analyst has stated, ''It did violence to the plain statutory
language and purpose, ignored the legislative history
and rested upon reasoning mainly notable for its comfortable insulation from re~ality. '' Convisser, supra ·at

316.
The doctrine has been applied by Federal courts
from time to time since then, both in dealing with the
Interstate Commerce Commission and with the N a.tional
Labor Relations Board and most recently in the field
·of Fedeval anti-trust litigation; see, for example, von
'Mehren, The Anti-trust Laws and Regulated Industries;
11
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The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction,. 67 HARV. L.
REV. 929 (1954).
The early rationale for such decisions was hased
upon the purported desire for uniformity, but later the
reason given for invocation of the doctrine was the expertise of the administrative board in question. Nevertheless,
as the United States Supreme Court stated in the Western Pacific· case:
''No fixed formula exists for -applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the
question is whether the reasons for the existence
of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes served will be aided by its application in
the particular litigation.'' United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 64.
Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce· Act was not
completely emascul'ated by the Abilene case. In Pennsylvan~a R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Min. Co., 237 U.S. 121, 35
Sup. Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867 (1915) a shipper brought
suit in the Pennsylv,ania state court against the railroad
for damages caused by the carrier's failure to furnish
cars for the transportation of coal. The railroad moved
to dismiss because the state court was without jurisdiction. Both the tri~al court and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held th'at the state court did have jurisdiction,
and affirmed judgn1ent against the carrier. The _United
States Sup-reme Court affirmed. That court held that
while Section 9 standing alone n1ight be construed as
giving exclusive jurisdiction to either ·federal courts or
agencies, this section was n1odified by Sec. 22, which

12
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pre-served all pre-existing common law and statutory
remedies. In construing the Act as a whole, and citing
the Ab~lene case, the court said:
"It did not supersede the _jllrisdiction.~_o;t
state courts~ __in any . case, n~W- or old, wh~.r.e~ .the
d_e_cision , did.-llQ;,t....J.nyolye . the .det.e.rmina..tion _of
matters c~ling_Jor the exercis.~._Qf.Jh~. !.1dmiP,iBtrative J2QWe_r_ ,ancl...discretion_Q.[..ihe__ ·Commission,
9~r relate_ Jo _a_ subj~ci _a~__to_ which. the iuris_dictiQn
o£ the_ federal courts _h~d.. .o.therwise he_en_made._
exGh!§iv~." (.Jd., at 130, emphasis added)
The court made the sound distinction .between an
att ack on .a rule o£ practice itself (w:Qer~. the question of
its fairness lay primarily wjthin. the_ judgment and -~di§
cretion of the- CQmmission},.JlPJian attack on the 1n.anner.
in. which the carrie;r 's rlJle is enforc~d, where ''there i~-·
go~-=~d!fiini~tr~tiy~__ g_!!est_iqg~j;q._vqly~d" id., at 131-32. The
court pointed out that :vather than attack the rule, the
plaintiff-shipper had "relied on the carrier's own rule
as evidence" id., at 134, which of course is what appellant
is doing in the instant case. Clearly, therefore, state
courts still have jurisdiction of such cases.
1

The landmark cases set forth the limits of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction at the present time in the
],ederal courts. In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants
Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 66 L. Ed. 943, 42 Sup. Ct.
477 (1922), the doctrine was not applied. This was a
case commenced by the shipper against the carrier in
a state court in Minnesota for an alleged overcharge.
The issue was whether. the Railroad was entitled to
13
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make a charge for reconsignment of corn while en route.
This turned on an interpretation of the tariffs which
governed the contract of carriage. Mr. Justice Brandeis
pointed out that in c.ases wh.,er_e a !a_te _wltich ~w~~s~alr~a,dy
fixed and agreed. upon_-~§ being applicable,~w=~attM~ed
as un.r~~_SQA!1R.le__ or__ ~!ljJlstly~ discriminatpry,. there mu~t
b_e_J2r-.~limin~r~-~Q.rt to_.tP~. 0P.~t~t§!9n.
"B~t ,. WP~~- eoi).~truetiQ~;t._~l!all

be given to -~

railro~ ,tap.ff_ p~~~e~t~-~ ordinarily --~-~g!!~~-t!2.!L.Qi

law which does not differ in character from those
PJ:"~S~nted W:tt~IJ.~ ,Jh~_:, ~~Op.§J!J!~ttQ~ ___pf any other
docul?~!l~~-i_~~~~!l dis put~." I d., at 291.
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The United States Supreme Court in that 0ase held
that the issues were properly within the jurisdiction of
the Minnesota state court. In that case Brandeis rather
effectively does aw~ay with the uniformity argument
stating:
''The contention that courts are without jurisdiction of cases involving a disputed question of
construction of an interstate tariff, unles.s there
has been a preliminary resort to the Commission
for its decision, rests, in the main, upon the
following argument: The purpose of the Act to
Regulate ~Commerce is to secure and preserve
unifonnity. Hence, the carrier is required to file
tariffs establishing uniform rates and charges,
and is prohibited from exacting or accepting any
payment not set forth in the tariff. Uniformity
is impossible if the several courts, state~ Federal, are permitted, in case of disputed construction, to deter1nine what the rate or charge is
which the tariff prescribes. To insure uniformity
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the true construction must, in case of dispute, be
determined by the Commission.
"This argument is unsound. It is true that
uniformity is the paramount purpose of the Commerce Act. But it is not true that uniformity
in construction of a t~ariff c.an be attained only
through a preliminary resort to the Commission
to settle the construction in dispute. Every question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a
question of law; and where the question concerns
an interstate tariff, it is one of Federal Law.
If the parties properly preserve their rights, .a
construction given by any court, whether it be
Federal or state, may ultimately be reviewed by
this court, either on writ of error or on writ of
certiorari; and thereby uniformity in construction
may be secured. Hence, the attainment of uniformity does not require that in every case where
the construction of a tariff is in dispute, there
shall be a preliminary resort to the Commission.''
Id. at 290-91.
In Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. American T~e & Timber
Co., 234 U.S. 138, 58 L. Ed. 1255, 34 Sup. Ct. 885 (1914),
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applied. There
the shipper had a contract with the Union Pacific to
furnish it railroad cross-ties, and it claimed that the
Texas-Pacific Railroad wrongfully refused to haul them.
There__~~-~--~o t!t.r.if~ _specifica~ly_ ~9v~r.~11g --~ross 7tie~S, but.
there was a tariff for "lumber all kinds'' which the
s~pp~:r ~l~a!!Q~i~l.JYJ1:.§~. . .~ppl~.G-~l?J~LJ_o_<~jt..~____ er._Q§.§: ties. Th:g._~
the ~was a. djspute as__tQ_ classification of _a __particular
WWle. There the shipper, prior to commencement of its
action against the earner m the Federal court, had
----

.
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'

1nade complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Then as the Supreme Court s.aid:
''By an amendment to the answer it was insisted (by the Railroad) that under Section 9 of
the Act to regulate commerce the plaintiff could
not prosecute its action because, by making the
complaint as it had done, to the Interstate Com. merce Commission, concerning the failure to treat
the lumber tariff as embracing the rate on crossties, the plaintiff had elected to proceed before
the Commission." (Id., at 145, emphasis added).
There was a conflict in the evidnece as to whether
the "all lumber" tariff covered cross-ties.
The motion to dismiss made by the Railroad was as
follows:
. "Because under the facts and circumstances
now dvsclosed by the record, and compatible with
the act of Congress of the United States to regulate interstate commerce, this court has no po"rer
to consider and decide the subject matters which
are complained of, or to a'vard the relief prayed
for by plaintiff." (Id., at 141, emphasis added).
The Supreme Court ordered that the case be disInissed. This decision was eight years prior to the Great
Northern Ravlway decision, in 'Yhich the Supre1ne Court
restricted the doctrine of prilnary jurisdiction by pointing out that questions of construction need not be referred, and in so doing the court distinguished the
Ameri'can Tie case.
One of the most recent pronouncements of the lTnited
16
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States Supre1ne Court, upon which the Railroad here so
heavily relies, is United States v. Western Pac. R. Co.,
supra. In this case the Railroad sued the shipper (the
United States Government) in the lTnited States Court
of Claims for alleged undercharges. The questions raised
inter alia were whether the articles in question fell within
the tariff category of incendiary bombs, or whether they
in fact had another classificati~~,l{t-~uld allow a lesser
rate, and if the former category were held applicable,
whether the resulting rate was unreasonable. It was thus
a case involving a dispute as to classification. The
shipper-defendant in that case requested that a referral
be made to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
Court of Claims, relying on an earlier decision of its
own, Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl.
390, 111 F. Supp. 266 ( 1953), refused to do this and after
interpreting the tariff, gave summary judg1nent to the
Railroad, 132 Ct. CL 115, 131 F. Supp. 919 ( 1955). The
Supreme Court in that case held that these matters
should properly have been referred to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, but it stated:
"By no means do we imply that matters of
tarff construction are never cognizable in the
courts. We adhere to the distinction laid down in
Great Northern R. Co. vs. Merchants Elevator
Co., supra, which call for a decision based on the
particular facts of each case." United States v.
Western Pac. R. Co., supra, at 69.
~

This then is the history of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction as developed by the Federal Court system.
While termed a valuable corollary in some senses, it has
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also been stated that "it is . . . becoming a shibboleth'.
J·affe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered, 102 U. P .A. L.
REV. 577 (1954). The doctrine's principal function to
date has been to restrict jurisdiction previously granted
by statute. The Railroad in the instant case seeks to use
it as a means of creating jurisdiction when none exists
by statute. The Railroad has cited no case in the court
below and the app.ellant here has been unable to find any
case where referral from a state court to a Federal administrative agency was upheld over the objection of the
defendant-shipper. The Railroad is thereby asking this
court to ,sanction a procedure heretofore unauthorized
by the very Federal court system which has erected this
doctrine, and by so doing in effect to create the rigiit
of a carrier, by the device of commencing this action in
the forum of this state, to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which it cannot otherwise do.
(b) Analysis of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction shows
it does not arise in the instant case.

To determine whether this doctrine arises in the
instant case an analysis should be made of its basic
nature. Abstractly, the very term "prin1ary jurisdiction"
is comparative. From it one would assUI11e that there
would be a "secondary jurisdiction'' (i.e., that there were
two bodies which had jurisdiction, one of which was
"primary" to another). Thus the very tern1 assumes the
existence of concurrent initial jurisdiction.
As one of the leading authorities on this question
has stated:
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Questions of primary jurisdiction arise only
when the statutory arrangements are such that
administrative and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent for the initial decision of some questions."
(DA\7'IS, supra, 664, emphasis added.)
The first question to be asked is obviously: is there
here a concurrent jurisdiction between the Utah Court
and the Interstate c·ommerce Commission~ Section 9 of
the Act (49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9) expressly authorizes ~~Y
person claimin~to .h~ . . damaged by any carrier to alternatively make complaint to the Commission or to a
district court of the United States. Thus in the
ca~e of __{he _lihipper __ suing.. a __ c~:cri~_r_ (the converse of
our situation) the Interstate Commerce Commission does
ha~._.00n.cnrr1mt juri§diction ,.~th '""'t~~'"'JI;g~t~~ _S.tates
.
D~ttrt· by ~ft@-. exp.ress ~texro;;L~-.m~ .tlu~__ statn_t~. In
such a case the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would
apply, in certain fact situations, to limit the shipper's
alternative recourse to the courts.
...__,_'t.\···

II'J:Iolo~~~~,~.,.-~.v.,.

-

1;-..:;
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"'r.:'r~--~--..,......,·,:;l'f"•
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But the~~l!iLr9~4~ h~.~ ng~ right !()_~Q_:ffiJ:ll.eA~e il~_ ~ction
b_~!Q_J;_~_ Jh~ .!l!terstate J~;ornm~rce Cqmmi~sio.n. The Act
makes no ;erovi_si<?!!___fg:r_ "Jhi.:~- p"rocedure. _ No case.s. have
'b~~I1 found even hplding that such procedu.re~ _would _be
i_J!l:Qli~g by _t_~e. }\.gt._ 'rh11s quite obviously there js _no
C<?_~cur,rent. jurisdiction and the doctrine does not come
into plar~ ~

-

If Congress had intended to give the Railroad the
right to bring proceedings~gl~s\r its shippers before the
Commission, it could have quite easily provided

19
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for it, but since 1887 carriers have not been given this
right and apparently have been content to bring their
action for undercharges in either state or United States
Federal courts. The policy reasons be~1ind sucll a distinction are sound. Shippers are not the group that the
Interstate Commerce Act intended to regulate and exer,cise supervison over. They should not be haled before a
Federal administrative body at the election of the regulated industry merely because they happen to do bil.sine~s
with this entity. Basic consideration of fairness urge
that they should be allowed to defen~ such claims in the
courts of their domicile where they are doing business.
The fact is, therefore, that this is not a case \Yhere
a Federal agency and a state court exercise joint jurisdjction, where the powers of the state court may be expanded or contracted at the wish of Federal authority.
~ehe sole initial jurisdiction in this case is \Yith the trial
court.
The rule.)s .well. esta!l~-...1!1~JCJ!Mi~<:>~Y~!~~9f~~
state court is pre-empted .. by . Federal ·legi$1~ t_ion pply
when the enactll}ep.t in g,ue~tion ~~_pr~.§sly_ or by pllDl!_cation so states ..This rule has been characterized as. a manifestation of "due regard for the rightful independence
of the states", Healy v. Ratta, 292 l.,_.S. 263, 5-± Sup. Ct.
700, 78 L.Ed. 12-±S (1934), and as a reflection that Federal
instrumentalities must ~~be ever n1indful of the dignity
of the states", The llfaccabees v. C·ity of ]\Torth Chicago,
125 F. 2d 330 (7th C~ir. 1942)~ ccrt. denied, 317 lT.S. 693,
63 Sup. Ct. ~32, 87 L. Ed. 555 ( 1943). The rationale underlying the principle has, ho\vever, been best expressed
20
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in a relatively recent opinion, Sq~tare D. Co. v. United
J~lectri~cal, Radio & Mach. W'krs., 123 F. Supp. 776 (ED
Mich, 1954), as a concern for '"preservation of our Federal system." In other words, the basis of the rule is a
recognition tha.t our's is a Federal, not a unitary, form
of government.
(c) Even if the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did

ari~s.e,

it is not applicable in this case.

This is not a case where it is alleged that a particular
. "-" n t"'e~t$ t:J(' f( btf .
h
. .
d
rate 1s rmres6nr>re. t 1s not a case w ere 1t 1s allege
that a particular article was not properly classified. It is
not even a con1bination of these factors "where ... the
questions of construction-Qlld reasonableness are so intertwined that the same factors are determinative on
both issues," which was the case in United States v. W e~t
ern Pac. R. Co., supra at 68. It is not a matter in which
the cost-allocation factors that have to go into rate
making are an issue. With only a few exceptions the
shipments in question in the instant actions retained the
same classification both before and after fabrication and
even in the exceptional cases the shipper does not urge
here that the charge was improper or unreasonable.
In this case the Railroad set forth certain rules
governing fabrication of structual iron and steel in transit, which, if they were followed, would make the through
rate applicable. The only question before the court is:
what do these rules mean~ What is their construction~
As the United States Supreme c·ourt made clear in
21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the Western Paci'fi-c case, matters of tariff construction
are still cognizable by the courts without the need for
referral. That court, in summing up its conclusion in
that case, stated:

"We say merely that where, .as here, the problem of cost allocation is relevant, and where therefore the questions of construction and reasonableness are so intertwined that the same factors
are determinati·ve on both issues, that it vs the
Commission which must first pass on them."
(United States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra at
69, emphasis added).
"Cost-allocation", of course, has to do v~ith ratesthe money to be charged which bears a reasonable relation to the class of product shipped which will earn a
fuir return for the carrier. To determine 'vhat is a reasonable rate, one must know about cost allocation, and this
is unquestionably an esoteric field where expertise may
well be the touchstone.
But this case does not deal with these factors, The
cost allocation factors that went into the computation of
a through-rate and a short-haul rate for iron bars, for
example, will remain completely unaffected by a court's
determination of what the Railroad meant by ''fabrication". While in the A1neri·can Ti~e case the court may have
felt it could not properly decide whether railroad cross
ties were included in a "lu1nber, all kinds'~ classification
without knowing what the cost-allocations "'ere that lead
to the establislnnent of the rate for that classification,
there is no such problen1 here. The rates have been fixed
and are uncontested.
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Certainly the fact that the words of a tariff defining
a certain classification might include railroad cross ties
(or castings filled with napalm jel) may only be half of
the picture, if the cost-allocation factors which went
into the establishment of the rate covering this classification would make this conclusion an absurdity. The
question there is, would the resulting rate, considering
the cost factors involved in the transportation of the article, result in a fair and reasonable return to the Railroad~ ~ut~whetl).er. J~tl.! interii1edi~t~,=-i~bri~~·t.ox_ bendsjts
~te~!__ b~rs, me, rely_ stores thenl~!lr _Jies_ __them in knots,
does_ ~ot affec_t o~~- particle tb:e .oost-allocatio:n which
goes into making up the rate _fur= this classification
(asslliill,ng that the fabrication <ig~~ not_ change __th~-~l~s_s
of the :Qroductl_. These steps have nothing to do with
CJlSt .to~ the -c~ailroad, but only._,.cost_J_(),, t4e shipper.
--

~-~

..-~;:;.~-....:J....

.--

,_

..

The United States Supreme Court has always recognized that disputed questions of construction, being one
of the very basic things which courts were established
to handle, remain untainted by its self-imposed doctrine
of limited jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine a purer
case of disputed construction than the one before this
court. Obscure and complex these rules may be. But, of
course, it is usually the obscure and complex contract
ihat leads to litigation. Surely the difficulty inherent
for the Railroad in ·pursuading the court to accept its
interpretation of its own obscure and complex wording
is not an argument for persuading this court that it is
incapable of interpreting it. The United States Supreme
Court said in the Western Pacific case, at 66-67, "There
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the Court held that where the question is simply one of
construction the courts may pass on it as an issue 'solely
of law'". There is quite a difference between a question
which is "simply one of construction" and "one of simple
construction". To argue that a court can retain jurisdiction only of the !~is an affront to the court's
basic capacity.
The Western Pacvfic case is not determinative, or
even helpful to us in this particular case for two other
reasons. First, it says nothing as to the correct procedure
to be followed where a defendant shipper opposes the
reference, rather than requests it.* Certainly this is a
critical distinction where the plaintiff could not have
brought it before the Connnission of its OW'll volition.
Second, it was a case where both the trial court and the
administrative agency were part of the same Federal
political system. It does not help us in defining the relationship between state courts and Federal aillninistrative bodies.
POINT IV.
THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE COURTS OF
THIS STATE WISH TO ABDICATE VOLUNTARILY SOME
OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND WHETHER THEY CAN
DO THIS.

It has been noted that state courts have been most
reluctant in the absence of definitive legislatiYe enactThis possibility does not even occur to most of the writers
in the field. Thus one writer uses as subheadings to his article,
"Plaintiffs' Efforts to Avoid the Doctrine'' and "Defendants'
Efforts to Invoke the Doctrine." von Mehren, supra at 941 & 947.
-K·
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ment, to abdicate their jurisdiction (and in consequence,
their judicial power and responsibility) to administrative
bodies. This observation is equally true whether argument has been made that the jurisdiction of the executive
agency is "exclusive", that there has been no "exhaustion
of administrative remedy" or that executive jurisdiction,
while "concurrent", is "primary". The policy which
buttresses this approach is well stated in Papetti
.v .
.__..
Al~candro, al1 Mass. 382, . at 386, 58 N. E. 2d 155,at 157
(1944) : "The burden is strongly on him who asserts that
the fundamental right of all persons of access to the
court has been taken away by legislation."
.

.

~

-

There are, of course, numerous state cases in which
the defendant has resisted successfully the assertion of
initial jurisdiction by the courts. These have been decided
on the basis of explicit constitutional or legislative mandates. The converse, however, is equally true: the courts
of the several states have not relinquished gratuitously
their judicial perogatives to their administrative cousins.
J;f a v:.~lig~~!Yiitt~P.1~1YJ~-~-~-- - !lQ(§.9. _p:rqy·>
ide.d, the QQnrts have
r.~tained the totality of their .j11risdiction (their power)
'-;~-~i'th~i~~-·~~;p,onsibility. 1J!fai~--- Realty Co. v. Blackstone
Valley Gas & Electric Co., 59 R.I. 29, 193 A. 879 (1937}
is typical~ The realty company owned a multi-unit rental
building. It, as well as each of its tenants, used electricity.
Application was made to the electric company for the
installation of a single meter for the building; the landlord company proposed to re-sell electricity to its tenants.
The electric company refused, although it provided such
service to other landlord users. Even after the electric
25
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company was successful in obtaining, from the State
Division of Public Utilities, a ruling prohibiting such an
arrangement, the electric company continued to sell for
resale to preferred customers. The realty co:rppany then
brought action to recover damages for the unreasonable
discrimination to which it had been subjected. The defendant sought the shelter of an administrative determination; it argued that the jurisdiction of the State
Division of Public Utilities was concurrent with that of
the court and that the administrative jurisdiction was
primary to that of the judiciary. The court rejected this
contention. It noted that the Division could not entertain
an action for, and could not award, damages. There was
no "election provision" in the applicable statutes. There
was, hence, no basis of concurrent jurisdiction necessary
to the invocation of the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction". The jurisdiction of the judiciary was, in short,
exclusive. Another case illustrative of the proposition is
llouston Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad Commission 19 S. W. 2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd 124
Tex. 375, 78 S. W. 2d 591 (1935). Against the contention
of the defendants that the plaintiffs, shippers, must apply, as a condition precedent to a judicial challenge of
the validity of a rate, to the commission to undo or modjfy its action (an argument 'vhich "~as, technically, one
of "exhaustion of adn1inistrative remedy'', rather than
of "primary jurisdiction"), the court held at 588.
"In rate making, the functions of the commission are legislative in character and its orders
prospective in operation... Insofar as its orders
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already made are concerned, the courts alone
can give relief."
Waukesha Gas & E. Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., 175
Wis. 420, 184 N. W. 702 (1921) considers a demurrer, upheld by the trial court, founded upon the suggestion that
a regulatory body, the Railroad Commission, had ·"exclusive jurisdiction". The motor company had counterclaimed, alleging a breach of the electric company's contract to supply gas to it. The court reversed. It held that
such exclusive jurisdiction is dependent upon statute and
that, where no statute confers such jurisdiction, it does
not exist.
In the event that the written law of a state has explicitly bestowed quasi-judicial jurisdiction concurrent
with that of the courts, upon an administrative agency,
there has been adherence to the principle of separation
of powers. In some instances, this adherence has led tQ
the outrightr~i~:Gtio~,.. ~~~th~ ~tate ..plane, ~fjh~~chanics____ _
of "primary jurisdiction". A group of California decisions exemplifies the approach, Truck Owners, Inc., v.
Supervor Court, 194 Cal. 146, 228 P. 19 (1924) ; Vallejo
Bus Co. v. Superior Co~~rt, 19 Cal. App. 201, 65 P. 2d 86
(1937); Mvller v. R~ai.Zroad Commission, 9 Cal. 2d 190, 70
P. 2d 164 (1937). T_!lese cases construe the applicable law
to be that, in a controversy regarding a question of fact,
the Railroad
Com:mlssion's
jurisdiction Js not only con-+_ .. -- rurrent with tha.L of the courts, but, when invoked, prinlar:~ The cases do not, however, demonstrate a willingness on the part of the judiciary to divest itself of its
responsibility. To the contrary, they hold that, until the
-·+-
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primary executive jurisdiction is actually exercised, the
courts will adjudicate all questions, including those of
fact.
The cardinal bulwark of state court rejection of the
philosophy that admittedly quasi-judicial regulatory bodies should become more and more "judicial" and less and
less "quasi" has been their steadfast refusal to abandon
the principles enunciated in Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Merchants Elevator Co., supra, and r~iterated in Un~ted
States v. Western Pac. R. Co., supra. State courts, mindful of the importance of the separation of powers, have,
as have Federal courts, held questions of law, as opposed
to questions of fact, to be within their exclusive.._not concurrent, not primary, but exclusive - jurisdiction. In
llfain Realty Co. v. Blackstone Gas & Electric Co., supra,
for instance, the court considered the probable character
of its ruling had the Rhode Island statute provided for
administrative primary jurisdiction. It opined that this
circumstance would not alter its decision. It cited Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Brady, 288 U. S. 448, 457, 53 Sup.
Ct. 441, 77 L. Ed. 888 ( 1933) :
"But if the rule, regulation, or practice of the
carrier is not attacked and the shipper's claim is
grounded upon its violation or discrn11inatory enforcenlent, there is no ad1ninistrativ-e question involved. In such cases the court is required 1nerely
to decide whether the carrier has departed fron1 its
established standard. The decision does not concern the reasonableness or v-aliditY of the rule it·self and it has no tendency against uniformity or
other purpose of the _.~.-\ct. Suits for da1nages upon
28
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such grounds may be prosecuted without action
or finding by the commissioner."
In Gardner v. Ri,ch Mfg. Co., 68 Cal. App. 725, 158
P. 2d 23 (1945) the defendant .shipper contended that
the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the
action of :e!_aintiff carriers for additional freight charges.
It was argued that the plaintiff must exhaust its administrative remedies before the Railroad Commission. The
court, in rejecting the contention, held at 730-731, 158 P.
2d at 25-26:
<

"In making this argument defendants misconceives the nature of these actions. They are
simply actions to recover a stated amount of
money-the difference betvveen the amount paid
under the contract between the carriers and the
shipper and that under the rates fixed by the
railroad commission in the aforesaid decisions
and orders. The court ·was called upon to decide
what rate the railroad commission had established
for a particular commodity transported by motor
vehicle in specified quantities. It was then simply
a question of the application of these rates to the
facts as disclosed by the evidence. No question of
fixing.}:~J~§ 9l:. rules 9.r r~gulations is in any way
involved. That had already been determined by the.
railroad commission in its decisions and orders.
There is, therefore, no reason why the superior
court should not have jurisdiction of these cases
for the effect of the judgments, if properly rendered, is to enforce the rates already established
by the Railroad Commission."

Chicago

Ci~ty

Ry. Co. v. Chicago and W.I.R.R. Co ...
29

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

331 Ill. 151, 162 N. E. 852 (1928) involved an action for
damages incident to plaintiff's shifti~g of material and
equipment consequential to defendant's repair of a viaduct. Defendant challenged jurisdiction. The court, at
158, 162 N. E. at 854, spoke as follows:
"The question involved is the duty of the parties to the contract under the admitted facts and
the ordinances by which they operate in the city
of Chicago. This question is purely one of law.
Jurisd~ction is authority to hear and decide a
cause."
The Court of Ap.peals of the State of New York has
taken the same view, Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Unvon Gas.
Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N. E. 2d 287 (1938). The action was
one to restrain defendant company from collection of a
"reconnection charge'' on the ground that "service
charges" were legislatively prohibited. Defendant questioned jurisdiction. Citing Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puri,tan
Coal Min. Co., supra, it was decided that, inasmuch as
the issue was one of law, direct application to the judiciary for relief was available. In Brentwood-McMechan
Water Co. v. Wheeling, 121 W. Va. 373, 4 S. E. 2d 300
(1939), a case involving respective rights under a contract between two water companies, it "~as stated at 378,
4 S. E. 2d at 303 :
"The public service co1nmission, under the
broad powers given it by the legislature, has the
right to pass upon the question of whether or not
a public utility may enter into a given contract,
because of the effect sueh contract may have upon
the power of the utility to carry out its purposes;
30
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but when a contract is once entered into, its construction and interpretation and the rights growing out of the same, including the right to terminate, are to be determined by the court.''
Transportation Co. v. Publc Service Comm~ssion, 125
W.Va. 71, 23 S. E. 2d 53 (1942) reaffirmed emphatically
the Brentwo-od-M eM echan rule: it held nugatory the
commission's consent to the termination of a public utility contract. A final example of state court assertion of
judicial prerogative, and the concommitant refusal to
abdicate it to the executive branch, is M adregano v. W vsconsin Gas & Electrvc Co., 181 Wis. 611, 195 N. W. 861
(1923). Plaintiff initiated an action to force defendant to
furnish electric service. Defendant sought to remove the
cause from original judicial scrutiny and into the hands
of the Wisconsin Railroad Commission. The court, at 618)
195 N. W. at 264, reacted in the following fashion:

'
f
iLe
reaso..na.bleness _of a rule established by
a..JL1lb1i~_Jltility __ fQX~Jhe. conduct and management

of its business should . be _first determined in .Jl
p_roceding before the Railroad __ Comrnission.. While
this is true, when rules are once estab~ished,. the
parties may ·prop-erly-.appeal to. the Court to yi~
dicate their rights in r~spect the.re'fo: It should iiof
befoi:gotten ffiat the ~~judicial power is under our
Cons1itution vested in the courfSand tlia1 it cannot
by Act of the LegisJ.itpr~-Ji~ witlJgr_~w~
the
courls and confer.r~d upon an administrative. body.
Wilen -~eas,~nable. rates aiid "rules· or·· regula1ions
have been established, the enforcement of rights
of parties in relation thereto presents matters
which are properly a subject for judicial inquiry."

.fr9.m

31

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Whenever, in these matters, administrative agencies
have been found to lack jurisdiction, the courts have not
thought of relinguishing that portion of their power
'vhich one of the litigants would prefer to have reside with
the executive branch. The reason is apparent. Power, if
it is not to constitute tyranny, must be joined with responsibility. If a regulatory body is not bestowed with
an iota of such responsibilty in a given matter, it should
not be granted power, for its determinations will quite
likely be a hindrance to the court, to the responsible body.
In this connection, the language of Waukesha Gas & E.
Co. v. Waukesha Motor Co., supra, at 426-27, 184 N. W.
at 704, is helpful:
"In this case the findings of the Railroad
Commission can be of no assistance to the court.
The obligations of tiLe utility are meas_ured _by
terms of its contract with the defendant. If that
is a _Y.alid_ contract, and \Ve no\v ,m-.e-so~as.sJrm.ing,
the only issl]._e to p~ qeter:rl)ined is whether there
wa,§_ __ ~!_ breach the~eof --~n--tlte part- ~f tlu~ ~itlliti
and_~pe ~9P.P.t.()f t.h~ damage~,s-qJ~>t~j~~g__ _ b~call~-~
of such breach. This is a judicial question, pure
and simple. It is a wrong sustained by the defendant which the Railroad Conmrission has no
power to redress, neither can it be of any assistance to the court in deterinining the rights of the
parties."
This very court has previously ruled on questions of
tariff construction without invoking the doctrine of referral. Western Pac. R. Co. v. Wasatch Chemical Oo.,
117 Utah 41,.1_217 P. 2d 371 (1950). Evidently it felt
attliaF-tiine that the doctrine of prhnary jurisdiction -\vas
unnecessary in the State of Utah.
-~----·--'- ----~ --·-·-~..,~-'~

•• ..,-...----~·
--..........~~~~-~_,..-~~

.~=-:-:
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In light of thesee.La~~~i1i~6, serious question can be
raised as to the desirability of referral. While the Federal courts have created their own body of common law
on this matter, this court is perfectly free, within Utah's
court system, to disregard it if it feels it either to be
undesirable or jurisdictionally impossible. The criticism
leveled at the Federal court doctrine by several learned
authors previously referred to shows the many problems
that the policy can create. (Jaffe, Convisser, supra.)
But, the particular problems before this court in
this case raise the even more fundamental questionwhether the trial court has the power to make such a
referral.
The Railroad has asked that the Interstate Commerce Commission answer five different questions dealing with the construction and interpretation of Tariff
7188-P. For example, the Railroad asks:
"Under the provisions· of UPRR Tariff 7188P, effective May 15, 1952, and applicable supplements thereto: Is a transit operator entitled to the
balance of through-rate on outbound straight carload shipments of products listed in Item 5 of
said tariff if said products have merely been
stored at the transit station and have not been
fabricated or reworked at the transit station~"
(r.p. 38)
This is clearly the referral of a question of law. (The
order of referral of the trial court also orders determination of questions of fact, although this was not even
·requested in the Railroad's petition.) Aside from the
33
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point that this is the very -type of construction question
that the United States Supreme Court in the Great
Northern case has held should not be referred, it is urged
that a Utah court cannot refer such a question to the
Interstate Connnerce Commission.
A trial court has a duty to determine the controversy presented to it. As the United States Supreme
Court has said :
"It (the trial court) cannot, of its own motion,
or upon the request of one party, abdicate its duty
to determine by its own judgment the controversy pres~t; and to devolve that duty upon
any of its~ J-c...t~." J(imberly v. Arms, 129 U.S.
512, 524, 32 L. Ed. 764 (1889)
The Utah Constitution provides that:
"The Judicial power of the State shall be
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme Court, in district courts, in
justices of the peace, and such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established
by law." (Art. VIII, Sec. 1)
The Constitution further provides that:
"The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crnninal, not excepted in this c·onstitution, and not prohibited by
law." (Art. \-'III, Sec. 7.)
The Constitution in dealing 'Yith a judge. pro tempore,
provides that any cause in the district court n1ay be tried
before such a judge only 'vhen agreed upon by the parties or their attorneys of record. (Art. \-.III, Sec. 5.)
34
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There is no provision for relegation of questions of law
to a non-judicial body of this state.
Nor do the Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by this
court justify referral of these questions.
As Moore, the great authority on the Federal Rules
of Civ# Procedure, states, ''But the court cannot, without the consent of the parties, refer the whole case to
the master for final decision." 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 2950 (1951).
This principle is borne out by Rule 43 (.a) UR~CP
which requires that all testimony of the witnesses should
be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided
for by the rules. Rule 53 deals with the question of
referrals to a master. Rule 53 (b) states that, ''A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule.''
The reasons for the extreme reluctance to delegate
such powers are well set forth in an opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
''Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court,
in every suit, save where exceptional circumstances are shown. It is a matter of common
knowledge that references gre.atly increase the
cost of litigation and delay and postpone the end
of litigation. References are expensive and timeconsuming. The delay in some instances is unbelievably long. Likewise, the increase in cost is
heavy. For nearly a century, litigants and members of the bar have been crying against this
avoidable burden of costs and this inexcusable
delay. Likewise; the litigants prefer, and are en-
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titled to, the decision of the Judge of the court
before whom the suit is brought. Greater confidence in the outcome of the contest and more
respect for the judgment of the court arises when
the trial is by the Judge.'' Adventures iJn Good
Eatilng v. Best Places to E~at, 131 F. 2d 809 (7th
Cir. 1942') .
In the case of a jury trial (and defendants are here
entitled to a jury trial) ~a "reference shall be made only
when the issues are complicated.'' Rule 53 (b) URCP.
Tlie only effect of the findings of the mastei on the
i ssues presented to hi~ is that they are admissible as
evidence on the matters found, and may be read to the
jury. Rule 53(e) (3) URCP.

-.) .......

__

.,

_ _ . _ , •..

..,....~~.........._,. ••

~~""i'F

-

.......,r'i?GK"~:A&

-

, ••

·-

--

•

-

-

--

•

--

Even in cases of a non-jury trial the rule provides
that "Reference shall, in the absence of ':~ritten consent
of the part~§_ be_ made -~2!!1I U"QQn a_ sP-om11g" that some
excepti~ C9_!lgitioiLI:eq.uixes i+ '? RpJQ __ 53-(.b~ IIRQP. T}?.e
'record is barren of any showing at all by the Railroad
of exceptional conditions requiring such a referral.

-~-

Rule 53(£) gives a party the right to object to the
appointment of any person as a master.
All of these argun1ents militate against referring
these questions to any 1naster. Defendant is entitled to
have its c,ause heard before a jury if it so chooses. To
refer these questions to a 1naster is only to add an additional burden to the litigants, because at 1nost the
1naster's findings, prepared after a tedious administnitive,process, will not be deter1ninative.
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It is obvious that the Railroad feels that a Utah trial
court would be in sufficient awe of any recommendations
of the Interstate Commerce Commission that it would
merely act as a rubber st~amp to the opinions of the
experts.
But it is singular indeed that a Utah court, even
if it felt the issues were proper for____r.e_ferenceJ, w.oJild.
refe_r'""i~t~pl~~ an adm~nistratime body completely outs_iqe
t~~~Jl~.~-o-~j!~1udicw1·. ·system,··-,~~-~~t!!g~~~-----~-~ . ,.tr~,~~~E~,:
~en~!t!X _j:)_i, the ~~£~1~~g£!~E?!!!~,~~:- ~~h~--c reference,
when not compell~~ by 1aw,- is not only .Y!<?!~i~-- of Jh~
principle 'o:f sepa~atio~· -~~~~£~-~ers but also of the prin-CTPie, eqll~iiY~i~po;t;;t. t~··~A~~ri~"M·- gove;iurt~;t~~2i
1e<Ieral1sni.. rrrs=~~~~O·<~~~e ®~~.o~;;kable that .it ·f~lt, as
it did in the instant case, that it could order that the
Interst,ate Commerce _ Commission
make a reJ?ort
and
..
-_· •
deter;mination (r.p. 43).
~_,,._.,_-.o.:.·-.• .• f----·"'····;;:; .. ~··:··--·T·.
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It is axiomatic that a master to whom a matter is
referred by the trial court must be a person responsiJble
to and accountable to the court.
''A master in chancery is an assistant of the
chancellor, and his function is the performance
of Acts, either judicial or ministerial in nature
which the chancellor may see fit, in accordance
with equity practice, to require of him. He acts
as the representative of the chancery court, and
his official conduct is subject to the court's control and supervision.'' 19 AM. JUR., Equ~ty, '§
365 (cf. 45 AM. JUR., References, § 17)
It is impossible to read Rule 53, URCP, which
37
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pertains to the equivalent of the master in chancery, in
any other light. It is, in fact, most difficult to imagine
an .administration of justice which would even ·smack
of efficiency and good order if a master's status were
in law coordivnate im power with or· superior iln power
to that of the trial judge. Such a ''master" could, with
impunity, transcend the limitations of the order of reference; he could, by caprice, refuse to carry out all of or
a part of his mandate. Perhaps more important, he could
not be disciplined or removed for prejudice, bias, misconduct or an expression of an opinion prior to the
hearing. Such a "master", in short, would be irresponsible. In this light, he would not be, and could not be,
as a matter of law, a master. Any. attempt by any court
to so designate him would be tneffectual. A court ca'YIInot
abdicate its dutiJes to a "master" not responsible to and
accowntable to ~t.
~in~~~!lt ord~r, __ ii~.,..!J.:=i_§= ~2!!~!~~~~ a mere

reference, i~~~~p.pie~t.loc~!h.~ _ f~.!:~g:Q_~ng_ objection· and,
hence~ invalid. By s11ch_ ~911_~tlJ1S.tiQp., the_ Federal Inter"""-"-
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one hand, t:vanscend the limitations of the reference or,
O!! the .o.ther, leave unfulfilled the reference's m~.~tef
~;f'· C.an the ti:ial court .m~<i1':eE~~ Jlie" membflX!!...cl
( .: ... the c·olnn!i§si9n, individually or as a body, if they demo~
stra:t~· prejudice o~---bia.'s:~ 1niseonduet then1selYes o~--~~~---...-' "' . '•
-_,....,.N>'
..
press an_ op_inion_qn the interpretation of the tariff prior
th;l1earing ~ l\Ia~ifestly, the ans,ver to each of this
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senes of interrogatories is in the negative. The Interstate Commerce Commission is a Federal instrumentality. It 'is an agent of the Federal government, not of
any of the states. _!!.s procedure conforms to Federal,...
not state, directives. Its members, a.s to theiL qfficial

_.,.,...,.....-

-~

ac.tions, are cloaked with immunit_Y ...~rom_ st~d~r~~tirul_
or djscipJjpe,,In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 658,
_.p
--

-~-·}'>o··.~·::-..=--r.·r..!!"~'r

•

34 L.

-·

~-

Ed~

55 (1890). Under these circumstances, the Interstate Commerce Commission cannot, as a matter of law,
be the trial court's master.
The answer to this absurdity is obvious. If the Railroad feels that the trial court is incapable of analyzing
the terms of a contract which the Railroad evidently
felt when it was filed were perfectly understandable
to any shipper vvho wished to avail himself of it, and the
Interstate ·Commerce Commission feels the matter of sufficie!lt importance, the Interstate Commerce Commission

-can petition the court to appear as an amicus curiae.
T_he court could then have the advantage of ''expertise''
as to questions of 1aw. As to questions of fact, these
matters would have to be presented before the court,
or jury, in any event. If the Railroad feels that employees
of the Commission are helpful to it on that score, there
·is no reason for a two-time appearance of these gentleIn en, once before the master and once before the court.
The ultimate trier of the fact should be able to see and
observe these worthies at first hand.
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CONCLUSION
The Railroad seeks, by bringing its action in the
courts of this state, to gain access to a Federal administrative body not otherwise available to it. It thus seeks
to extend the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction", a
creature of common law of the Federal judiciary, so
that it serves to create jurisdiction, instead of its historical role as a restriction on jurisdiction. The instant
case comes within the well-defined exception to the doctrine of p·rimary jurisdiction. The doctrine, however,
does not even apply where the administrative agency in
question does not have initial concurrent jurisdiction,
which the Interstate Commerce Commission does not
have here. The sole question remaining, therefore, is
whether the state court should, and whether it can, abdicate some of its functions to such an .agency. The policy
against such abdieation is great, and in any event, the
court has no power to so refer.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, ·CLENDENIN,
l\IOFFAT & :JIABEY
b~~ ALBERT

J.

CoLTON

CAL,TIN L. RAl\IPTON
Attorneys for .£_1ppellant
Structural Steel & Forge Co.
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